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Introduction
Demand side externalities in network industries can give raise to major advantages for incumbent firms that enjoy large installed customer bases. As theoretical models of network effects show, network markets can easily tip so that a firm with a slightly higher market share captures all customers driving its competitors off the market. The most dramatic example may have been the case of the third mobile network operator in Slovenia, Vega, which exited from the Slovenian mobile market in 2006 after five years of operations, reportedly at least partly due to the aggressive on-net/off-net price differences offered by the two incumbents ( Telecommunications markets exhibit strong network externalities, leading to individual consumer demands being interdependent (see Rohlfs, 1974) . While network effects can spur the adoption of telecommunications services, they also create competitive concerns. As has been shown elsewhere, in markets with interdependent demand, consumers are expected to choose the larger network to reap the benefits of network externalities so that the market may tip towards one firm (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1994) . Without network compatibility, a new entrant's superior technology may not be sufficient to compete with an incumbent as the switching costs may lock-in consumers even if the incumbent has an inferior technology or service (see Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Arthur, 1989; Gandal, 2002) . In order to prevent market foreclosure, telecommunications networks are typically required by regulation to interconnect with each other (see, e.g., Armstrong, 1998).
As mobile telecommunications networks are required to interconnect with each other, a subscriber of any network can call the subscribers of any other networks. However, as intra network calls (so-called on-net calls) are often charged at a lower rate than inter-network calls (so-called off-net calls), there is less than full compatibility in an economic sense even though the networks are technically compatible. Put differently, the differentiation between on-net and off-net calls induces so-called tariff-mediated network effects (see Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998; Hoernig, 2007; . The magnitude of the onnet/off-net difference therefore determines the degree of economic (in-)compatibility and, thereby, also the degree of substitutability and competition between networks.
Notably though, even without tariff-mediated network externalities the size of a network can affect consumers, as network size can eventually serve as a quality signal (see Kim and Kwon, 2003) when consumers cannot distinguish the quality characteristics of competitors.
Along with size effects, consumers are expected to take into account other factors such as the costs, coverage, and quality of customer service and of after sales care, the range of services (e.g., SMS, voice mail, and other value added services). 1 Among others, the coverage of mobile networks can be seen as a more substantial part of service provision, since calls can be completed if the area is covered by a network. Valletti (1999) argues that not only network size, but also their coverage may be viewed as a quality indicator for mobile services when customers are sufficiently mobile. However, networks will be considered homogenous in terms of coverage if most customers are located in a narrow area that is covered by all competing networks so that price competition becomes more important. Quite generally, competition via differentiated tariffs typically characterizes firm behaviour in competitive environments. It should be also noted though that the degree of price competition is also affected by the magnitude of eventual switching costs (Klemperer, 1987; Suleymanova and Wey, 2011).
This paper provides an empirical analysis of main determinants of consumer choice in the Turkish mobile telecommunications market. The roles that coverage, tariffs and consumer characteristics play for the individual choice of mobile networks are analyzed along with network effects on the local and the national level. For this purpose the next section provides an overview of other empirical studies focusing on network effects in mobile telecommunications. Section 3 then briefly summarizes the development of the Turkish mobile telecommunications market. The empirical methodology is described in section 4, before a description of the data is provided in section 5. The sixth section reports the empirical results before section 7 concludes.
1 These factors have also been examined through surveys conducted by Oftel (2003) . Also see Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2007) as well as Grzybowski (2008) .
Literature Overview
Apart from the theoretical contributions mentioned in section 1, there are several empirical studies analyzing network effects in telecommunications. Positive network effects are generally observed and found to be highly significant in diffusion models of mobile telecommunications. Gruber and Verboven (2001) that network effects are limited to each specific network and argues that this is due to the significant on-net discounts that generate operator-specific effects and lower the degree of compatibility between the networks which in turn limits the extent of market-wide network effects.
The studies that use market level data also find support for the existence of network effects in the diffusion process. Fu (2004) argues that tariff-mediated externalities play an important role in competition in the Taiwanese market. He finds that networks with a large subscriber base attract more new consumers than other networks, and the magnitude becomes larger with the price differential between on-net and off-net calls in Taiwan. However, in a cross-country study Grajek and Kretschmer (2009) find that, in contrast to consumers' adoption decisions, the usage intensity of mobile telephony exhibits decreasing network effects as late subscribers have a weaker preference intensity for mobile telecommunications services so that additional users decrease the average usage.
In the analysis of network effects on consumer choice both industry-level and firm-level studies utilize what has been called "macro empiricism" (Greenstein, 1993) , inferring individuals' preferences from the observation of aggregate market behaviour (Fu, 2004) . In the studies mentioned above, network effects are usually measured through use of lagged numbers of adoptions. This approach can be criticized on many grounds. Although it provides advantages in the absence of detailed consumer data, these studies ignore individuals' preferences for network specific characteristics such as quality, coverage and services.
Another drawback is that this methodology assumes that network effects are "global", that is all connections or all groups are assumed to be equally valuable in a network, even though the literature on social networks and group formation proposes the opposite. While all of these studies yield important insights into individual decision making and social network effects, these analyses have been constrained to interactions within households and among friends, but not analyzed a wider local or regional area. In contrast, the analysis presented in this paper will focus on local or regional network effects, taking into account that operators' market shares often vary between regions. Hence, the level of network effects analyzed in the following is at the intermediate level between global network effects and family or friends-based "very local" network effects. Before this analysis is presented,
however, it appears useful to introduce some key aspects of the mobile telecommunications market in Turkey. 
Mobile Telecommunications in Turkey

Regional Differences
Even though Turkcell is clearly dominant at the national level, there are important differences when regional market shares are considered. Table 2 about here]
The regional market shares show that the Turkcell's dominance is strongest in the Marmara region, which is also the most populated part of Turkey. In the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey, Turkcell only accounts for 38 and 35 percent of postpaid subscribers, respectively.
When both prepaid and postpaid subscriber numbers are jointly considered, Turkcell's market share drops to 54 percent in the Black Sea region and to 50 percent in South-eastern Anatolia.
Surprisingly, the smallest operator, Avea, is the market leader in postpaid services in eastern and south eastern parts of Turkey, and Avea has a share very close to Turkcell in the postpaid market in the Black Sea region. The differences in market shares of mobile networks in different regions suggest that network effects can be local and each firm may gain advantages in different regions. In such a case, competition policy should consider defining relevant markets and dominant market positions taking local network effects into account. The significance of local effects should also lead firms to focus on creating micro level network effects, possibly by regional price and marketing policies.
In the next section the data is introduced and the model to measure network effects in consumer choice. If local network effects exist, the results would imply that network effects do not necessarily support a single firm throughout the country, but they may work for the benefit of different firms in different regions.
Methodology
The methodology employed in this paper is based on discrete choice analysis, which has been pioneered by McFadden (1974) and which is widely used to model individual decisions. It is also closely related to theoretical papers by Aoki (1995) 
where igk S is a social component of subscriber i's utility function ( 1, ..., ) 
where i V is a private component and i  is a random utility term. The general form of the estimation equation can be written as follows:
In the formulation above 
where d ij is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if an individual chooses alternative j and 0 otherwise.
Data and Definition of Variables
The data set for the empirical analysis has been obtained from Table 3 presents the levels of importance assigned by consumers to service-related factors. For example, 96.4 % of Turkcell's customers claim that coverage is an important factor for their network choice; whereas this rate is 94.2 % and 93.1% for Telsim and Avea, respectively.
Furthermore, data on tariffs and base stations is used as are the networks' local and national market shares (called network-specific variables) as determinants of network choice. All variables are explicitly defined in Table 4 .
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here]
All data used in the analysis has been obtained from ICTA. Tariffs are calculated as the average of the on-net-and the off-net-calling price per minute in a standard tariff plan. 6 Base stations are measured as each individual network's share of base stations in the province where a surveyed consumer resides. National market shares and local market shares of the networks are measured as the ratio of a given network's subscriber base over the total number of consumers on national and regional levels, respectively.
Empirical Results
Equation (3) is estimated using a conditional logit model procedure with different alternative combinations of network-specific variables, applying Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests to check the IIA assumption on the error terms. In order to test how local network size affects 5 Although the survey respondents were asked to report the level of importance they assign to network-specific variables on a five-point scale, they have been categorized as binary variables (high or low level of importance). 6 The tariff variable is constructed as a weighted average, using national shares of on-net and off-net calling minutes. Other weights such as local shares and call termination shares have also been considered, but did not change the results.
consumers' choice, regional dummy variables and network shares at the province level are employed. Following previous empirical studies, national market shares are used to measure network effects at the country level.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The estimation results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . Column 1 in Table 5 reports estimated parameters when all network-specific factors are included. According to these results, the only significant network-specific variable is the market share at the province level, whereas the national market share, the share of base stations, and tariffs are all not significant.
However, because of the high correlation between the network-specific variables, the effects of network-specific variables are estimated one by one as reported in columns 6 to 9. The robustness of the parameter estimates is also checked by employing different combinations of network specific variables in the regressions as reported in columns 2 to 5. In all model specifications a highly significant and positive coefficient is found for local network effects, which means that choices of other people that live in the same area are important for consumers' choice. This finding implies that network externalities are not necessarily nationwide, but can be local. This is quite intuitive since (a) consumers can usually better observe the choices made in their local surrounding, and (b) most mobile calls are typically still made to customers within the same local area.
With respect to individual demographic variables, being male rather than a female has a positive impact on the choice of Turkcell, while being married has a negative impact. For the choice of Telsim-Vodafone, age and education level variables have negative effects.
Furthermore, Avea is more preferred among young consumers, who use voice services (minutes of usage) more than others. While the effect of individual income levels is not significant for the choice of network, Telsim-Vodafone is found to be less preferable when mobile expenditures increase.
The results presented in Table 5 show that neither tariffs nor base stations have significant effects on consumer choice. It should be noted that according to information from ICTA all networks had coverage above 95 % at the national level at the time when the survey was conducted. Furthermore, the data cannot be used to measure eventual consumer responses to changes in coverage, as the survey was conducted at a certain point of time, and it was not repeated afterwards. This limitation unfortunately also applies for any estimate of the effects that tariff changes may have.
In order to overcome this limitation, consumer responses regarding their preferences with respect to various network and operator characteristics are utilized. Table 6 shows the regression results when stated consumer preferences are included. Although these variables do not necessarily capture the direct effects that certain network characteristics have on network choice, according to likelihood ratio test consumer preferences with respect to service characteristics are significant at the 1 % significance level. The results show that the level of importance that consumers assign to tariffs, service quality and customer services have a significant effect on the choice of network. Avea is more attractive for those consumers who assign a higher level of importance to tariffs whereas Turkcell is less. In contrast, consumers who report to highly value service quality and customer services are more likely to choose Turkcell.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
It should be also noted that regional dummy variables are also highly significant both in restricted and unrestricted empirical models presented in Table 5 and Table 6 , meaning that network choice is affected by the regional location of consumers. Since tariffs do not vary across regions, another possible explanation for these effects could be regional differences in income and network coverage (the number of base stations). However, these variables have not been found to be significant for consumer choice in the regressions. The result suggests, however, that the competitiveness of the different mobile networks varies across regions in
Turkey. The variation in the regional market power of operators may also be due to differences in regional marketing success or in the numbers of sales offices/agencies.
Unfortunately though, there is no regional data available on marketing expenses or agencies so that this explanation has to be left unexplored for now.
Conclusion
The theoretical literature on markets with network effects has shown that demand-side externalities can induce the market to tip towards the largest firm. Macro-level empirical studies that analyze network effects commonly use the assumption that a network's overall size matters most to consumers or, because networks are interconnected, the number of mobile consumers over all networks (global network effects). In contrast, more micro-level studies have suggested that family and friends and social networks matter more for consumer choice than the overall network size.
This study suggests that, based on Turkish micro data, country-level network size does not appear to be necessarily the main factor that determines consumer choice, once individual and regional heterogeneity are taken into account. Furthermore, network characteristics and consumer preferences with respect to quality, coverage, tariffs, customer services and firm image also affect the choice of mobile network.
The analysis also suggests that local network effects are significant for consumer choice. This Note: ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
